By Prak Chan Thul and Lincoln Feast
PHNOM PENH/SYDNEY, Aug 31 (Reuters) - Cambodia said on Monday it did not intend to accept any more refugees from a South Pacific detention centre under an agreement with Australia, dealing a blow to the controversial resettlement scheme criticised by rights groups.
Read the full article on Reuters - AlertNet.
Robert Carmichael
PHNOM PENH— Cambodia has agreed to take more refugees from an Australian detention center on the island of Nauru, giving a boost to a $40 million resettlement deal that so far has been widely seen as an expensive failure for Australia. The pledge came after an unannounced visit to Phnom Penh by Australia’s immigration minister, Peter Dutton, during which he met Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen.
After Dutton’s meeting with Hun Sen, a Cambodian government spokesman told news media that the Southeast Asian nation is “ready to accept more refugees.”
That came after speculation that the controversial deal had, for all intents and purposes, collapsed.
Khieu Sopheak, a spokesman for Cambodia’s Ministry of Interior, said the memorandum of understanding between the two countries remains in force.
“Of course Cambodia will continue to receive more refugees from Nauru. And now we have been informed that four of them, [we] understand that they are voluntarily to resettle in Cambodia. So the team from the Ministry of Interior will [be] sent to interview them. I am not sure when, but in the near future,” said Sopheak.
Until now only four refugees had signed up to leave miserable conditions on the Pacific island of Nauru to make a new life in impoverished Cambodia. Three are Iranian; the other is an ethnic Rohingya from Myanmar.
The Rohingya man recently said he wants to leave Cambodia and return to Myanmar. Khieu Sopheak said his departure process is underway.
“The two governments of Cambodia and Australia’s immigration departments do not [oppose] the intention of that Rohingya man to return to Myanmar. And when will he go back? The answer is that when he receives the travel documents from the Myanmar government. I think that’s some weeks away,” said Sopheak.
The statement by Cambodia will prove some relief for Australia’s government, whose policy to “stop the boats” helped propel it to victory at the last election.
Yet Cambodia’s pledge to accept more refugees is hardly groundbreaking – it merely reiterates what it has long said under the existing, secretive agreement: that it will take a limited number of people and only if they volunteer to come to Cambodia.
The deal, which the two countries toasted with champagne in a rushed ceremony in Phnom Penh a year ago, has been criticized on numerous grounds by rights organizations, church groups, and opposition politicians in both countries.
The U.N. refugee agency says the deal undermines the principles of the refugee convention, to which both nations are a signatory.
Under the agreement, Australia agreed to pay all resettlement costs for a year, and pledged to give those who signed up thousands of dollars in cash, as well as language and skills training, and health insurance.
More than 600 refugees and asylum-seekers are thought to be on Nauru; hundreds more are in detention on Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island under an arrangement with Australia. Most are believed to be from countries in South Asia and the Middle East.
The gFSC global dashboard provides a quick snapshot of the country-level Food Security Clusters around the world. The updated dasboard shows that as of October 2015, the country-level Food Security Clusters remain only at 52 percent funded against their yearly requirements
Summary
In 2015, mixed maritime movements in South-East Asia were characterized by two distinct phases: from January to May, when the volume crossing the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea was significantly greater than during the same period in previous years; and from June to December, when such movements all but disappeared following the abandonment of thousands of refugees and migrants at sea in May
Some 1,600 refugees and migrants were estimated to have departed by sea from the Bay of Bengal in the second half of 2015, 96% less than in the second half of 2014. By contrast, the 31,000 departures estimated in the first half of 2015 were 34% higher than in the first half of 2014.
Refugees familiar with the route told UNHCR in interviews that the sharp decline in departures in the second half of 2015 was a result of increased scrutiny by—and of—authorities at both departure and arrival points and harsher conditions upon arrival, as demonstrated by the discovery of mass graves and the continued detention in Malaysia of the hundreds of refugees who disembarked in May.
In total, approximately 33,600 refugees and migrants travelled through South-East Asia in mixed maritime movements in 2015, including approximately 1,000 who either crossed the Strait of Malacca or attempted to reach Australia from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam.
Executive Summary
The year 2015 was a dramatic and traumatic period for refugees, in Australia and internationally. The number of people forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, violence and human rights violations is now at the highest level since World War II.1 The enormous challenges of global displacement have come to be symbolised by dramatic images of Syrian children washing up dead on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, Germans lining up to help refugees at train stations and Hungary’s barbed wire fence along its border.
In Australia, those images were mixed with alarming stories of the harm suffered by the people detained in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Less visibly, the year 2015 was marked by the implementation of dramatic changes in Australia’s asylum policy, affecting over 30,000 people in the Australian community. These included significant changes to the determination of refugee status, the introduction of Temporary Protection Visas and the removal of government-funded legal assistance.
New issues emerged, including protracted delays in the granting of citizenship and the denial of access to further or higher education for those on Temporary Protection Visas. Most of the old problems remained, including the vanishing prospects for many refugees of being reunited with their loved ones, access to education and employment, and the absence of suitable housing options.
This submission to the Australian Government on options for the 2016-17 Refugee and Humanitarian Program and for broader refugee policy reflects the voices and views, and the ideas and expertise, of individuals and organisations from across Australia: people from refugee backgrounds, people seeking asylum and the many brave and committed communities and organisations supporting them. It is the result of the largest consultation process ever conducted by RCOA in 30 years of preparing annual submissions, based on 50 face-to-face consultations in 17 cities and towns in eight states and territories, as well as additional meetings and teleconferences and a call for submissions. The submission also brings international perspectives, through gathered by RCOA from international networks, participation in global meetings and from refugee communities in Australia. While outlining current and future challenges for Australian refugee policy, our goal has been to draw together a constructive agenda of new ideas as well as incremental improvements to existing programs.
International Refugee Needs
The number of people forcibly displaced is now higher than at any point in the past seven decades. Almost 60 million people were displaced as at 31 December 2014, a number that has increased significantly in 2015. Unprecedented shortfalls in funding mean that humanitarian agencies “are no longer able to meet even the absolute minimum requirements of core protection and lifesaving assistance to preserve the human dignity of the people [they] care for.”
For the first time, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has projected that, for the first time, more than 1 million people will need resettlement, less than 1% of refugees are resettled. Given the remote chances of resettlement, people are increasingly forced to take dangerous journeys due to deteriorating conditions and the failure of states to protect.
While much international attention in 2015 focused on the tragic consequences of Syria’s civil war and its impacts across the Middle East and Europe, displacement in Africa continued to grow at an alarming rate. People continued to flee conflicts in Burundi, South Sudan, Central African Republic and Nigeria, while the conflict in Yemen displaced people into the Horn of Africa as well as Saudi Arabia and Oman.
This escalation of global displacement has been met with a mixed response. Countries like Turkey have kept their borders open despite already hosting over 2.7 million registered refugees. Many ordinary people have responded in a spirit of Willkommenskultur, such as those fishing people out of the sea in Greece and Indonesia, the Germans lining up to help at train stations, and those in Jordan inviting refugees into their homes. Additional pledges to resettle Syrians increased significantly, including through the pressure of public sentiment in Australia.
On the other hand, many governments are increasingly adopting punitive deterrent measures and seeking to shift responsibility for refugee protection to other countries, both fuelling and fuelled by rising xenophobic sentiment. Examples abound: Hungary’s construction of a barbed wire fence along its border with Serbia; the abandonment of Rohingya persons at sea; and the reaction of some American politicians to the resettlement of Syrian refugees.
In our consultations, we heard a wide range of concerns about situations of persecution and conditions in countries hosting refugees. Participants also identified particular countries, regions, ethnicities and religions as possible priorities for Australia’s resettlement program.
Since 2011, the Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA) has advocated a set of principles to be used in planning the Refugee and Humanitarian Program. These principles include: making resettlement widely available as a durable solution; focusing on resettling vulnerable people; emphasising family unity; using resettlement strategically to promote broader refugee protection while balancing resettlement needs in different regions; and including an additional response for large-scale emergency situations such as the situation in Syria. Our calls for a larger resettlement program and an emergency component have been broadly supported in our consultations and by the generous public response of offers of help for Syrian refugees in 2015.
Most importantly, the last principle we have suggested is the need for a coherent overarching government strategy for refugee protection, extending beyond refugee resettlement to aid and development, involvement in multilateral forums and diplomatic action. These and other strategies (such as exploring alternative paths to admission) were discussed at an international level during the 2015 UN High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges, which focused on the need to address the root causes of displacement and to move from crisis management to crisis resolution and prevention.
Some possible strategies would be to: invest in prevention and early intervention; use Australia’s aid and development program to support host states with large displaced communities, fund peacebuilding and rehabilitation programs and increase humanitarian aid for displaced communities; and use our diplomatic relations to increase pressure to improve refugee protection.
Why a regional focus model?
A key challenge faced by humanitarian agencies is how to ensure that limited available resources are allocated where they are most needed and are efficiently delivered in a principled manner. Decisions to allocate resources must strike a balance between meeting the immediate needs of crisis affected communities and supporting efforts to strengthen resilience and response preparedness to future emergencies.
To support humanitarian partners address some of these challenges, the OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) developed a risk model, in 2007, to analyze hazards, vulnerabilities and response capacity at the country level using a range of quantitative indicators.
The model identifies hazard-prone countries that combine high vulnerability to hazards and low capacity to respond and are therefore more likely to request or accept support from the international community. The model also includes a "Humanitarian" component reflecting issues more directly related to OCHA's coordinating work. It is designed to be a practical tool to inform and guide disaster managers. The tool is also used by OCHA to guide its regional strategic framework and annual work plan.
In 2016, the Regional Focus Model (RFM) covers analysis of 36 countries in the Asia-Pacific region under ROAP in Bangkok, Thailand and the Regional Office for the Pacific in Suva, Fiji. Similar to previous RFM analyses in 2014 and 2015, the model is based on INFORM (http://www.inform-index.org/) a global risk index that identifies and analyze where crises requiring international assistance may occur. It can be used to support decisions about prevention, preparedness and response.
Elibritt Karlsen
Law and Bills Digest Section
This Quick Guide contains official statistics released by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) from the resumption of offshore processing in 2012 until May 2016 (where available). The statistics contained herein include:
This Quick Guide also contains:
Background
On 8 February 2008, seven months after Kevin Rudd was sworn in as Prime Minister, the former Labor Government announced that the last remaining asylum seekers on Nauru had been transferred to Australia ending the Howard Government’s controversial ‘Pacific Solution’, which had begun in 2001 in response to rising numbers of asylum seekers arriving by boat.
However, by July 2010, then Prime Minister, Julia Gillard announced in her first major policy speech that the Government had begun having discussions with regional neighbours about the possibility of establishing a regional processing centre for the purpose of receiving and processing irregular entrants to the region. Whilst only 25 asylum seekers had travelled by boat to Australia to seek asylum in the 2007–08 financial year by the time Prime Minister Gillard made her announcement in July 2010, more than 5,000 people had travelled by boat to Australia to seek asylum (that is, during the 2009–10 financial year).
Whilst Prime Minister Gillard acknowledged that the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat to Australia was ‘very, very minor’ and that at the current rate of arrival it would take about 20 years to fill the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG) with asylum seekers, she identified a number of reasons why the processing of asylum seekers in other countries was again considered necessary:
Though it took another two years for her Government to secure the statutory and practical arrangements for asylum seekers to be sent to third countries, people began to be transferred to Nauru on 14 September 2012 and to Papua New Guinea(PNG) on 21 November 2012.
Two months before the 2013 federal election and in the wake of growing support for the Opposition’s tougher border protection policies, newly appointed Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd made a surprise announcement on 19 July 2013 that Australia had entered into a Regional Resettlement Arrangement with PNG. Under the Arrangement, _all_ (not just some) asylum seekers who arrive by boat would be transferred to PNG for processing and settlement in PNG and in any other participating regional State. He subsequently made a similar Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Nauru.
Notwithstanding Prime Minister Rudd’s announcement, the Australian Labor Party was unable to secure another term in office and on 7 September 2013, the Liberal and National parties were voted in to form a Coalition Government, led by Tony Abbott. The current Coalition Government, led by Malcolm Turnbull, continues to implement the former Government’s offshore processing arrangements. However, the offshore processing of asylum seekers in Nauru and PNG has proved contentious for a number of reasons, including:
See Annex 1 for further information about these concerns.
Offshore processing (referred to by the Australian Government as “regional processing”) is the term used to describe the arrangements by which Australia sends people seeking asylum who arrive by boat to either Nauru or on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG), where their refugee claims are determined. Australia is the only country in the world that uses other countries to process refugee claims. Offshore processing is justified by the Australian Government as “breaking the people smuggler’s business model” by removing the financial incentive to send boats to Australia and ensuring that those who arrive by boat do not gain an “unfair advantage” over others.
Offshore processing raises the following key concerns:
It seeks to punish rather than protect those in need.
It seeks to transfer Australia’s responsibility to protect to poorer, less well-equipped countries.
It has led to prolonged and indefinite detention and enormous human suffering.
The conditions of detention are inhumane, with grossly inadequate health care and inhumane treatment.
The system exposes highly vulnerable people to further harm, with consistent reports of sexual, physical and psychological abuse.
It undermines democratic principles of transparency, accountability and the separation of powers.
It is extraordinarily expensive.
By South-East Asia correspondent Liam Cochrane
The Australian Government has refused to explain why it has added a second refugee resettlement agency in Cambodia, when only one person has resettled there from Nauru.
Under the $55 million Australia-Cambodia deal, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was contracted to provide services for the Nauru refugees.
Australia has now engaged Connect Settlement Agency (CSA) to provide additional support.
"We are providing services in Cambodia but it's a very small program," said Laurie Nowell, spokesman for AMES Australia, a partner organisation with CSA.
Mr Nowell said the arrangement had only been in place for a short time and referred further questions to the Australian Government.
Australia pledged $40 million in aid money to the Cambodian Government to secure the deal, and allocated $15.5 million for resettlement services.
In total, five refugees resettled from Nauru to Cambodia, but four have since chosen to go back to their countries of origin.
The single participant remaining, a Rohingya man,told the ABC in June he was unhappy and desperate to leave.
Mohammed Roshid complained about the assistance he received and said he was told Australia's financial support for his resettlement would cease around the end of the year.
IOM said it was not able to comment on why another resettlement agency was now being brought in by Australia.
"I can simply reiterate that IOM continues to provide services to refugees in Cambodia, and should any additional ones come from Nauru, we will continue to provide services," said Joe Lowry, regional spokesman for IOM.
"For questions on what services Connect [Settlement Agency] is providing to the one refugee, you need to ask them, or the Australians."
The ABC sought clarification from the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
"The Australian Government also works with other settlement service providers to ensure that refugees voluntarily settled in Cambodia are provided with the full support and services required to be able to integrate well into their new community in Cambodia."
The Immigration Department declined to answer specific questions about why the new agency was needed, when it started or what it was doing in Cambodia.
At the time the Cambodia resettlement program was announced, another organisation called Hagar was said to be providing additional services.
But Hagar's website suggests it is not currently providing assistance to Mr Roshid.
"Hagar's Refugee Project currently supports 36 individuals — 14 UNHCR refugee cases and one UNHCR asylum case," Hagar said on its website.
Open sources reported damage to, loss of or the destruction of a wide range of humanitarian infrastructure on 160 occasions between January 2015 and June 2016.
In 2015, open sources reported damage to, loss of or the destruction of 114 aid infrastructure in 108 incidents. During the first six months of 2016, open sources reported damage to, loss of or the destruction of 61 aid infrastructures in 52 incidents. Infrastructure events report damage to, loss of or the destruction of assets, property or buildings of an aid agency through burglary, looting, raids, robbery, theft and military operations.
Updated 7 September 2016
Elibritt Karlsen
Law and Bills Digest Section
Contents
What is a refugee
What is resettlement?
How does the UN refugee agency decide who should be resettled?
Does Australia accept all refugees referred to it by the UN refugee agency?
Is there a queue?
Does Australia only take people from refugee camps?
Is resettlement the ‘right way’ to seek asylum?
How many refugees does Australia accept for resettlement?
How does Australia’s intake compare to other resettlement countries?
How does Australia’s refugee resettlement compare to its overall migrant intake?
How are visas under the Humanitarian Program distributed?
Are all Humanitarian Program visas for refugees?
Does Australia increase its intake for specific groups of refugees?
Should Australia increase its Humanitarian Program?
Does Australia contribute to the number of refugees requiring resettlement?
Do boat arrivals take the places from other refugees?
Can resettled refugees be reunited with family members?
Where are refugees resettled from?
How many refugees does Australia resettle from Indonesia?
How many refugees does Australia resettle from Malaysia?
Executive summary
Background to the project The aim of this paper is to start a conversation about how we can answer the question: What is a rights-based alternative to the current model of third country processing in Nauru and Papua New Guinea?
The Commission has endeavoured to identify options for responding to flight by sea which are consistent with Australia’s international human rights obligations.
In publishing this paper, the Commission is seeking to make a positive contribution to this difficult policy area. We have sought to provide the framework for an alternative policy response, rather than an exhaustive overview of all relevant measures or a detailed plan for implementation. The policy options set out in this paper are offered so that they can be debated, refined and, if they are deemed fit for purpose, implemented.
The Commission also acknowledges that the options put forward in this report could benefit from further policy development and economic analysis prior to implementation. Careful analysis will need to be undertaken of the likely flow-on effects of expanding the opportunities for safe entry in Australia and altering some of the Government’s foreign policy strategies in the ways that are set out in this paper. Further research, consultation and planning would also be required to tailor these measures to conditions in different countries, and to the needs of particular groups.
This paper sets out some alternative policy approaches that aim to protect human rights while also achieving the overall policy objective of preventing dangerous journeys by sea. The Commission is confident that the options proposed in this paper are compliant with Australia’s international human rights law obligations.
This paper does not specifically address the human rights issues arising from other policy measures aimed at deterring flight by sea, such as boat turnbacks and Temporary Protection Visas. However, the Commission considers that the rights-based options proposed in this paper could also be considered as alternatives to these policies.
This paper also does not address the situation of the approximately 30,000 people seeking asylum who are currently in Australia awaiting processing of their claims. The human rights implications of policies affecting these asylum seekers have been considered in other Commission publications.4 Methodology In March 2016, the Commission conducted a series of consultations to discuss alternative policy responses to flight by sea.
Consultation participants were selected on the basis of their expertise in the areas of refugee policy, human rights, international law and protection issues in the Asia–Pacific region. The feedback gathered through the consultations was supplemented through desktop research undertaken between February and June 2016.
In conducting this research and analysis, the Commission adopted a human rights-based approach to policy development.
A human rights-based approach sees strengthening the enjoyment of human rights as both a means and an end. Policies and programs which are based on this approach should further the realisation of human rights, and their planning and implementation should be guided by international human rights standards.5 Summary of findings The key driver of flight by sea towards Australia is the lack of effective protection for refugees and people seeking asylum in the Asia–Pacific region. As such, improving access to effective protection represents the most effective and sustainable means of preventing flight by sea. This is something that can only be achieved through cooperation and partnership with our regional neighbours.
Two core principles emerged from the research and consultation process which have guided the Commission in identifying alternative options:
The top priority of an alternative response should be enhancing protection for people fleeing persecution, in accordance with our international human rights obligations.
The focus of Australia’s policy response should shift from deterrence to prevention. Rather than seeking simply to discourage asylum seekers from embarking on dangerous journeys, an alternative response should aim to address the human rights violations which compel people to undertake these journeys in the first place.
While Australia is well-placed to support efforts to improve access to protection, there are two key obstacles which currently hamper these efforts:
There are few effective mechanisms for cooperation on refugee protection issues amongst states in the Asia– Pacific region, which hampers the region’s capacity to respond effectively to the needs of forcibly displaced people (including by ensuring appropriate settlement options across the region)
There are limited opportunities for safe entry for people wishing to seek protection in Australia.
Based on the information and evidence gathered through the research and consultation process, the Commission has identified two thematic areas (each encompassing a number of specific options) which are designed to overcome these obstacles and which together comprise an alternative, human rights-based policy response to flight by sea:
Expand opportunities for safe entry to Australia • Enhance foreign policy strategies on migration in the Asia–Pacific region.
The options put forward in this paper aim directly to address the key driver of flight by sea through creating and enhancing pathways to protection. They seek to achieve this by facilitating access to safe migration options, improving protection for refugees and people seeking asylum who are living in the region, and building towards more effective regional responses to refugee protection issues.
They respond to the human rights violations experienced by refugees and people seeking asylum during flight and in the context of displacement. They are also consistent with the Refugee Convention in that they avoid imposing penalties on the basis of a person’s mode of arrival or lack of documentation.
An overview of the various options identified by the Commission is contained in the table commencing on the next page.
By Madeline Gleeson
The refugee relocation agreement between Australia and the Kingdom of Cambodia—which marked its second anniversary in September 2016—is simultaneously one of the most extraordinary yet underwhelming components of Australia’s efforts to deter asylum seekers from reaching its territory by boat. The agreement is extraordinary in that it is the first of its kind, involving a traditional resettlement country relocating refugees to a developing country with limited capacity to meet their needs. It is underwhelming, however, in that just five people have been relocated to Cambodia to date under the accord, of which only one still remained in Cambodia at this writing.
In its basic terms, the agreement is straightforward. Formally recorded in a memorandum of understanding, the agreement provides that Cambodia will offer permanent settlement to people who originally sought asylum in Australia, were forcibly transferred to the Republic of Nauru for a refugee status determination process, have been determined to be refugees, and voluntarily accept an offer of settlement in Cambodia. The cost of the whole arrangement—believed to run as high as AUD 55 million in total—is covered by Australia alone (Nauru is not a party to the agreement).
Apart from these basics, few details about the Cambodia agreement have been clear. Its 17 articles and operational guidelines raise more questions than they answer. Secrecy has shrouded every aspect of its implementation, making it difficult for the Australian public and policymakers—or indeed the refugees whom the accord would impact—to assess how it operates in practice.
Two years on from the September 26, 2014 signing of the agreement, this article takes stock and seeks to answer some of the outstanding questions. What does the Cambodia agreement actually entail? What went wrong? And did it ever hold promise as a new model for responsibility sharing, or was it always doomed to fail?
Australia has a long history as a destination country for asylum seekers arriving spontaneously by boat, and refugees resettled through formal programs. After the number of people arriving by boat first peaked in 2001, with 5,516 arriving on 43 boats, the government of Prime Minister John Howard introduced a suite of measures to deter people from trying to reach Australia by sea. These combined measures—including boat turnbacks, offshore processing in Nauru and on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG), and temporary protection visas for refugees settled in Australia—caused the number of boat arrivals to fall dramatically. When the incoming government of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd subsequently dismantled these policies in 2008, asylum seekers once more began to set out for Australia by sea in increasing numbers, with arrivals reaching a peak of 17,202 people on 278 boats in 2012. They came from a range of countries, with significant numbers from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Sri Lanka in particular.
Over the past four years, in response to this increase, Australia has progressively returned to a highly restrictive set of policies to block and deter asylum seekers arriving by boat. Since August 2012, all asylum seekers who have reached Australian waters, and some others intercepted along the way, have been liable to removal offshore for processing in the Pacific (although in practice no new arrivals have been transferred from Australia to a regional processing center since December 2014). Under this policy, asylum seekers arriving between August 2012 and 2014 were screened and detained in Australia before being forcibly transferred to one of the two remote Pacific islands that had previously been used under the Howard-era policies: Nauru and Manus Island. Upon arrival, asylum seekers were detained for lengthy periods in harsh conditions to await the outcome of their cases.
While this policy formally remains in place, Australia also began turning back boats in September 2013, and since 2014 all asylum seekers intercepted at sea have been returned to their points of departure as a matter of practice—including to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Meanwhile, the issue of what to do next with those who have been found to be refugees on Nauru or Manus Island remains unresolved.
Between August 2012 and July 2013, under Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s controversial “no advantage” policy, asylum seekers transferred to Nauru and PNG were given no indication of when they would ultimately be resettled in Australia if found to be refugees. Successive Australian governments have adopted an even stricter position: No one arriving in Australia by boat on or after July 19, 2013 and sent offshore for processing will ever be eligible for resettlement in the country, no matter how long they wait.
The purpose of removing Australia as a possible settlement country for anyone arriving by boat is ostensibly to deter asylum seekers from attempting to reach protection in Australia by “irregular” means. However, this policy has done nothing to resolve the backlog of some 2,000 people who have already been transferred offshore and continue to struggle on Nauru and Manus Island without any clear plan for their futures.
In October 2015 the processing center in Nauru became an “open center,” giving people greater freedom of movement around Nauru. Similar measures were adopted for the PNG center in May 2016. But movement is still restricted for people on both islands, and there are real security concerns for vulnerable groups. At the same time, the indefinite nature of their situation continues to have deleterious impacts on people’s health and well-being. The Australian governments of Prime Ministers Rudd, Tony Abbott, and now Malcolm Turnbull have affirmed with unwavering consistency that resettlement in Australia is not an option for these men, women, and children. But what other viable alternatives exist?
In July 2013, Peter O’Neill, the Prime Minister of PNG, agreed to allow some refugees processed on Manus Island to settle locally, though not necessarily in Manus. By late 2014, however, a domestic plan to implement this promise was yet to be approved. As efforts to finalize a national resettlement plan progressed, UNHCR continued to highlight the formidable challenges and protection concerns that non-Melanesian refugees would face in the country. Safe and sustainable integration into the socioeconomic and cultural life of PNG would not be available for everyone found to be a refugee at the Manus Island processing center.
The situation on Nauru was even more tenuous. While the Nauruan government had appeared in 2013 to make a similar offer to settle some refugees, the small republic had limited capacity to do so. Asylum seekers and those determined to be refugees would be permitted to stay in Nauru on an ongoing basis (either in the processing center or outside of it in dedicated residential areas), holding temporary visas renewed every few months at the expense of the Australian government. But Nauru, like PNG, had not offered to take the entire transferred refugee population off Australia’s hands for good.
New Zealand extended a modest offer to resettle 150 refugees per year, possibly from Nauru or Manus Island, but it was turned down by an Australian government concerned about “putting a bit of Kiwi sugar on the table for people smugglers,” in the words of then-Australian Immigration Minister Scott Morrison.
And so the Australian government faced an immense political difficulty. It continued to insist throughout 2014 that refugees would never be resettled in Australia from Nauru or PNG, but it needed to find an alternative—fast. As the search for a suitable settlement country continued, those detained offshore entered another year of waiting for news about their future. Tensions built as more information leaked out of each detention center about the conditions inside, the United Nations increased pressure for Australia to bring its policies in line with international standards, and two young men died as a result of their incarceration on Manus Island. The physical and mental health of the people being held offshore was reported to be in rapid decline.
This is where Cambodia came into play. After extensive negotiations with various countries, the Australian government appeared to identify Cambodia as its best and last hope to avoid backtracking on its position of no resettlement in Australia. While the Cambodian government secured a significant financial commitment under the agreement, Australia hoped to have finally found the last missing piece of its offshore processing polices: a durable, long-term solution.
Asylum seekers arriving at the frontier of a signatory to the Refugee Convention (such as Australia) generally fall within the responsibility of that country, and resettlement is usually a process by which refugees move from countries of first asylum to others that are better positioned to meet their protection needs.
The September 2014 agreement flipped this general practice on its head. Under the new approach, refugees seeking asylum in one country are not only forcibly transferred to a second country with no track record of refugee processing, but are then given no real choice other than to “volunteer” for relocation to a third country that has never before resettled refugees through any formal process. Each step of the process is overseen and financed by Australia, the country which ordinarily would have responsibility for processing and settlement.
With governments around the world looking for new ways to manage large-scale displacement and allocate responsibility fairly between them and their regional neighbors, this new approach of contracting out processing and settlement might appear promising. In practice, though, it has proven a failure on multiple fronts.
The Cambodia agreement was controversial from the outset. After being negotiated in secret, without transparent consultation with parliament or civil society in either Australia or Cambodia, Morrison and Cambodian Interior Minister Sar Kheng toasted the signing of the accord with champagne at a ceremony in Phnom Penh. The mood was less celebratory on Nauru, where a wave of protests and a dramatic spike in self-harm swept through the asylum seeker and refugee populations.
The Cambodia agreement came the same week as news of an Australian law that would make people who had arrived by boat before July 19, 2013 eligible for temporary protection visas in Australia. The sense of injustice at the alternative fate in Cambodia for those who had arrived after this date was too much for some on Nauru. Emergency medical transport scrambled to evacuate a teenage girl to Australia after she reportedly swallowed washing powder and began vomiting blood. Other women who had also ingested laundry detergent received medical treatment on the island. A group of men and boys stitched their lips together. Unaccompanied children slit their wrists with razors. There were rumors that one man slit his own throat while another beat his head against a fence and with a rock until he lost consciousness, in the presence of children. Staff in the camp reported multiple mass suicide pacts.
The terms of the agreement—insofar as they were subsequently made available to the public—added to the confusion. Key details were missing or unclear, and contradictory statements by Australian and Cambodian government officials suggested there may never have been consensus on the most important matters.
How much would the entire arrangement cost, in terms of payments to Cambodia and for settlement services once refugees were there? The agreement was open-ended and vague, never mentioning specific dollar amounts. How many people would the agreement cover? Morrison claimed that as many as 1,000 refugees could be relocated, but Kheng said only that “three to four” refugees would be accepted at first as “a trial.” When would the agreement be activated? It was initially suggested that the first refugees would be relocated before the end of 2014, but by 2015 it began to look as if nobody would go to Cambodia at all.
During early visits by Cambodian delegations to Nauru in the first few months of 2015, no volunteers for relocation were forthcoming. Rumors began to spread about what was happening on the island at this time, and how far the Australian government might have been prepared to go to avoid the embarrassment of the agreement failing before it began. Confidential sources claimed Australian immigration officials had approached particularly vulnerable asylum seekers within the detention center on Nauru, and put pressure on them to accept relocation even though they had not yet had their asylum claims determined. If these rumors were to be believed, people had been offered a fast track to a positive refugee determination if they elected to go. Some staff claimed that refugees were promised all manner of services and support in Cambodia, regardless of whether or not they really existed.
This uncertainty about the entitlements, services, and quality of life that refugees could expect in Cambodia was one of the greatest obstacles to implementation of the agreement. It was not clear where people would be housed, and whether after an initial period of adjustment they would be forced to move outside the capital city, where appropriate support might not be available. There were no guarantees that Australia would continue to guarantee access to health services, education, and employment opportunities for as long as required by refugees relocated to Cambodia. For refugees struggling with life in limbo on Nauru, it was an impossible choice between staying in hardship or going to the unknown.
Four people did eventually take up the deal, touching down in Phnom Penh on June 4, 2015, and they were joined by a fifth refugee in November. Little was ever heard about what happened to them after arrival, but by June 2016 the original four would have chosen to go home rather than remain in Cambodia—despite having been found to hold a genuine fear of persecution in Iran and Myanmar, their countries of origin. The only one who remained was 26-year-old Mohammed Rashid, a Rohingya man from Myanmar, who said he could not go home because his country of origin would not recognize his citizenship. “I feel unwell, lonely, and sad,” Rashid told Australian journalists in March 2016. “I fear that I will die here.”
The Australian government has periodically suggested that more refugees may be considering relocating to Cambodia, but no such movement has materialized. Two years on, the Cambodia agreement has proven to be arguably the most expensive and ineffective way of relocating one single person, to a country he has said he would leave if he could.
The future of the Cambodia agreement (and any other arrangement of a similar nature that might be reached) is inextricably linked with the future of Australian offshore processing policies.
Four years after reopening the centers on Nauru and Manus Island, the Australian government still has no answer to where and when the people found to be refugees there will be resettled. As domestic and international pressure builds for the situation to be resolved, the Supreme Court of PNG has ruled the detention of people at the male-only center on Manus Island to be illegal and unconstitutional, thereby triggering their “release” into a new phase of limbo. The men previously detained at the center now have some freedom to move around Manus Island, but remain limited in their ability to move on from there, and are fearful of violent clashes with some of the locals. The PNG and Australian governments have indicated that further announcements will be made “in due course,” but details of the alternative arrangements under consideration have yet to emerge. Some refugees have been moved to Lae, the second-largest city in PNG, but there are grave fears for the safety and well-being of these and other men who may be sent there and expected to integrate. On Nauru there appear to be even fewer options about where refugees might ultimately be settled.
Other than Cambodia, various possibilities have been floated, including the Philippines, Kyrgyzstan, Canada, and Malaysia, but no concrete resettlement offers have materialized. Meanwhile the Australian government has contracted a new organization to provide services to the lone refugee still left in Cambodia under the agreement. Whereas previously the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was contracted to fill this role, the agency appears to have been either replaced or supplemented by Connect Settlement Services, which provides settlement services to refugees on Nauru. Rumors abound about what might have triggered the change, and the reasons why IOM might have pulled out of its agreement with Australia. As with most aspects of Australian asylum policy, the truth is murky.
Looking to the future, there are two imperatives. First, the men, women, and children found to be refugees on Nauru and the men on Manus Island need an urgent resolution to their cases. After years of waiting in limbo, living in conditions falling well short of what is required by minimum human-rights standards, and exposed to violence and abuse that has been widely documented by rights groups, the United Nations, and Australian government inquiries, the people being held offshore face dire issues of mental health and overall well-being. Experts on both islands describe adults and children deteriorating so quickly and drastically that they do not have years or even months of resilience left. An outcome is long overdue.
Second, refugee-rights organizations make clear that this outcome must be appropriate to people’s needs. In addition to the basic services and support that any resettlement country and program should provide, the resolution to these cases must take into account the additional harm they have endured during their prolonged detention and time spent in limbo in Nauru and PNG. Many of these adults and children will require long-term psychological support to help them recover from their experiences since arriving in Australia. Organizations working with these groups say specialized counseling will be particularly necessary for those who have been raped, assaulted, or otherwise abused in the detention centers or settlement camps, as well as for the families that have fallen apart as a result of detention conditions.
Human-rights groups also point out that appropriate access to a suitable health-care system will be vital for the people with serious health concerns that have been left unaddressed or inadequately treated for months or years on end. Those whose education and employment have been interrupted during their detention will also need additional support to help them regain their independence and rebuild their lives.
Above all, the 2,000 people who have been trapped in the “parallel universe” of offshore detention for the last few years will need strong communities to help them readjust to freedom, and settle into life in their new countries. Australia’s legal obligations to remedy the harm caused by its policies would suggest that people can only be resettled to countries where these services are already in place, and which have the capacity to meet their needs now—not at some aspirational point in the future.
Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law. 2016. Transfer Tracker. Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, July 19, 2016. Available Online.
Cochrane, Liam. 2016. Last Nauru Refugee in Cambodian Resettlement Program Set to Lose Australian Assistance, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, June 3, 2016. Available Online.
Doherty, Ben. 2016. Refugee with Growing Breast Lump Has Medical Transfer from Nauru Cancelled, The Guardian, August 6, 2016. Available Online.
Doyle, Kevin. 2015. Welcome to Cambodia: What Australia Isn't Telling Refugees, BBC News, May 27, 2015. Available Online.
Gleeson, Madeline. 2016. Offshore: Behind the Wire on Manus and Nauru. Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2016.
---. 2016. The Cambodia Agreement. Sydney: Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, 2016. Available Online.
Governments of Australia and the Kingdom of Cambodia. 2014. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Government of Australia Relating to the Settlement of Refugees in Cambodia. September 26, 2014. Available Online.
Handley, Erin and Shaun Turton. 2016. With One Nauru Transfer Remaining, Second Oversight Agency Added, Phnom Penh Post, August 9, 2016. Available Online.
Karlsen, Elibritt. 2016. Australia’s Offshore Processing of Asylum Seekers in Nauru and PNG: A Quick Guide to Statistics and Resources. Research Paper Series 2015-16, Australian Parliamentary Library, June 30, 2016. Available Online.
Murdoch, Lindsay. 2016. Remaining Two Refugees in Cambodia Rue Leaving Nauru, Sydney Morning Herald, March 13, 2016. Available Online.
Namah v Pato. 2016. PGSC 13; SC1497. Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea, April 26, 2016. Available Online.
Phillips, Janet. 2015. Boat Arrivals and Boat ‘Turnbacks’ in Australia Since 1976: A Quick Guide to the Statistics. Research Paper Series 2015-16, Australian Parliamentary Library, September 11, 2015. Available Online.
Schwartz, Dominique. 2013. Criticism for Australia-NZ Asylum Deal, ABC Radio Australia, February 11, 2013. Available Online.
Tlozek, Eric. 2016. Refugee Tries to Return to Detention on Manus Island After Resettlement in Lae, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, March 31, 2016. Available Online.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2013. UNHCR Monitoring Visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea: 23 to 25 October 2013. November 26, 2013. Available Online.
---. 2014. UNHCR Statement on Australia-Cambodia Agreement on Refugee Relocation. News release, September 26, 2014. Available Online.
Whyte, Sarah and Lindsay Murdoch. 2014. Champagne, Heckling as Cambodia, Australia Announce Deal to Resettle Refugees, Sydney Morning Herald, September 26, 2014. Available Online.
Recurrent earthquakes, floods, typhoons, and volcanoes present significant challenges to vulnerable populations in the East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) region. Some countries also face civil unrest and associated humanitarian impacts, as well as limited government capacity to respond to disasters. Between FY 2007 and FY 2016, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/ OFDA) and USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (USAID/ FFP) provided humanitarian assistance in response to a diverse range of natural and complex emergencies in the region. Examples include cyclones and typhoons in Burma, the Pacific Islands, and the Philippines; earthquakes in China, Indonesia, and Japan; floods in Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam; drought in the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Vietnam; volcanic eruptions in Indonesia and the Philippines; winter emergencies in Mongolia; and conflict in Burma, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste.
USAID provided approximately $322 million to respond to disasters in the EAP region between FY 2007 and FY 2016. USAID/ OFDA assistance included approximately $185 million for programs in agriculture and food security; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive hazards; economic recovery and market systems; health; humanitarian coordination and information management; logistics support and relief commodities; nutrition; protection; search and rescue; risk management policy and practice; shelter and settlements; and water, sanitation, and hygiene. USAID/FFP support included more than $137 million for food assistance in the form of U.S.-purchased food, locally and regionally purchased food, cash transfers, food vouchers, and related activities.
In the last decade, USAID responded to 118 disasters in EAP. USAID frequently deployed humanitarian teams to the region, including six Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs). USAID deployed DARTs to Burma after Cyclone Nargis in FY 2008; to Indonesia following an earthquake in FY 2010; to New Zealand following an earthquake in FY 2011; to Japan in response to an earthquake and resulting tsunami and nuclear emergency in FY 2011; to the Marshall Islands in FY 2013 due to a drought; and to the Philippines in FY 2014 for Typhoon Haiyan. USAID also activated multiple Washington, D.C.-based Response Management Teams to support coordination and response efforts.
This study maps out the major weaknesses of each fragile situation on the latest country performance assessment exercises and identifies overall common issues that need special attention.
While investments in transport, energy, education, health, private sector development, and other areas remain necessary, much more must be done to ensure that these investments are sustainable. Rethinking ADB’s engagement in fragile countries is critically important. This must be backed by a comprehensive understanding of the governance, institutional, political, and social issues that are behind each country’s exposure to conflict or fragility.
Findings show that the weakest areas in fragile and conflict-affected countries are policies for social inclusion/equity, followed by structural policies, and public sector management and institutions. Economic management has generally the highest ranking or is the strongest area in many such countries.
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, 2016-17, UPDATED 19 DECEMBER 2016
Elibritt Karlsen
Law and Bills Digest Section
This Quick Guide contains official statistics released by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) from the resumption of offshore processing in 2012 until October 2016. The statistics contained herein include:
Cost of operating the offshore processing centres in PNG and Nauru
Total number of asylum seekers at Offshore Processing Centres
Number of asylum seekers at each Processing Centre
Nationalities of asylum seekers at each Processing Centre
Number of children accommodated at the Processing Centres
Number of females accommodated at the Processing Centres
Number of arrivals and departures from Processing Centres
Refugee determinations per month at each Processing Centre
Percentage of asylum seekers found to be refugees in Nauru
Percentage of asylum seekers found to be refugees in PNG
This Quick Guide also contains:
Annex 1 – List of inquiries and reports into offshore processing
Annex 2 – List of court judgments and related commentary
Background
On 8 February 2008, seven months after Kevin Rudd was sworn in as Prime Minister, the former Labor Government announced that the last remaining asylum seekers on Nauru had been transferred to Australia ending the Howard Government’s controversial ‘Pacific Solution’, which had begun in 2001 in response to rising numbers of asylum seekers arriving by boat.
However, by July 2010, then Prime Minister, Julia Gillard announced in her first major policy speech that the Government had begun having discussions with regional neighbours about the possibility of establishing a regional processing centre for the purpose of receiving and processing irregular entrants to the region. Whilst only 25 asylum seekers had travelled by boat to Australia to seek asylum in the 2007–08 financial year by the time Prime Minister Gillard made her announcement in July 2010, more than 5,000 people had travelled by boat to Australia to seek asylum (that is, during the 2009–10 financial year).
Whilst Prime Minister Gillard acknowledged that the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat to Australia was ‘very, very minor’ and that at the current rate of arrival it would take about 20 years to fill the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG) with asylum seekers, she identified a number of reasons why the processing of asylum seekers in other countries was, again, considered necessary:
to remove the financial incentive for the people smugglers to send boats to Australia
to ensure that those arriving by boat do not get an unfair advantage over others
to secure Australia’s borders and create a fair and orderly migration
to prevent people embarking on a voyage across dangerous seas with the ever present risk of death
to ensure that everyone is subject to a consistent, fair assessment process
to improve the protection outcomes for refugees by establishing a framework for orderly migration within the region
to prevent overcrowding in detention facilities in Australia
to respond to increased numbers of unauthorised people movements in the region and around the world and
to acknowledge that irregular migration is a global challenge that can only be tackled by nations working together.
Though it took another two years for her Government to secure the statutory and practical arrangements for asylum seekers to be sent to third countries, people began to be transferred to Nauru on 14 September 2012 and to Papua New Guinea (PNG) on 21 November 2012.
Two months before the 2013 federal election, and in the wake of growing support for the Opposition’s tougher border protection policies, newly appointed Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd made a surprise announcement on 19 July 2013 that Australia had entered into a Regional Resettlement Arrangement with PNG. Under the Arrangement, all (not just some) asylum seekers who arrive by boat would be transferred to PNG for processing and settlement in PNG and in any other participating regional State. He subsequently made a similar Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Nauru.
Notwithstanding Prime Minister Rudd’s announcement, the Australian Labor Party was unable to secure another term in office and, on 7 September 2013, the Liberal and National parties were voted in to form a Coalition Government, led by Tony Abbott. The current Coalition Government, led by Malcolm Turnbull, continues to implement the former Government’s offshore processing arrangements. However, the offshore processing of asylum seekers in Nauru and PNG has proved contentious for a number of reasons, including:
the financial cost (see statistics below)
ongoing concerns about the safety and security of asylum seekers and refugees in the Processing Centres and in the broader community
ongoing concerns about the desirability and sustainability of involuntary settlement (currently in Nauru and PNG)
prolonged uncertainty and punitive living conditions which are said to be causing or exacerbating psychological harm and
inadequate transparency and independent oversight.
See Annex 1 for further information about these concerns.
MYANMAR
A CERF allocation of almost US$4.4 million has been approved to support the humanitarian response following the 9 October attacks and subsequent security operations in the northern part of Rakhine. WFP has begun a second round of emergency food distributions in Maungdaw north. As of 27 February, 23,700 people, most of whom are displaced, have been reached with food, while 22,700 have received nutrition support in this round. 279 displaced families were allowed to return to their villages in northern Rakhine last week. Distribution of assistance from Malaysia has begun in Maungdaw. Access and movement restrictions continue to undermine the quality of the life-saving services humanitarian organizations can provide.1
23,700 people reached with food assistance
BANGLADESH
A seasonal increase of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) has been reported in Cox’s Bazar among Rohingya communities who have crossed from Rakhine state, Myanmar. There is no evidence of a cholera outbreak, although this remains a concern. Health awareness activities are being strengthened in response. Partners have also observed a measles outbreak among children in Cox’s Bazar. Vaccination campaigns are taking place in camps and surrounding villages. On 23 February, UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee completed her mission to Bangladesh where she spoke to new arrivals and afterwards expressed particular concern about SGBV and child trauma.
PHILIPPINES
As of 25 February, more than 30,000 people remain displaced by flooding in northeastern Mindanao, with most staying with relatives or friends. Surigao del Norte, which was also affected by the 10 February earthquake, still has 1,150 people displaced by flooding that are staying in evacuation centres. Local disaster management authorities continue to monitor the situation and provide assistance to those displaced.3
30,000 people remain displaced
INDONESIA
Between 23 and 26 February, floods were reported in Aceh, and various locations in Java. An estimated 2,300 people are temporarily displaced following damage to their homes. Local governments are responding to the situation and have provided basic relief items. High levels of precipitation are predicted in Papua, Maluku and Sulawesi throughout March.4
2,300 people temporarily displaced
SOLOMON ISLANDS, VANUATU, NAURU
Following an outbreak of dengue in the Solomon Islands, 10,095 suspected cases have been reported across all 10 provinces of the country. Recent heavy rains may have exacerbated the situation as previous trends show a spike in reported cases following the wet season. Vanuatu has also experienced an increasing number of dengue cases, with over 1,700 reported. The majority of suspected cases are in Port Vila, however cases have also been reported in Luganville, Lenakel and Norsup. In Nauru, dengue has reportedly affected approximately 88 people, with one death reported.
Key figures
43,000 Rohingya refugees estimated to have crossed from northern Rakhine State into Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh in 2016
168,500 Rohingya refugees who have led Myanmar since 2012, including 44,000 in 2016
112,500 Rohingya refugees believed to have travelled by sea to Malaysia from 2012 to 2015
18% Percentage of surveyed Rohingya refugee women and girls married before the age of 16
2016 was the fifth consecutive year of large-scale movements of Rohingya refugees from Rakhine state in Myanmar to other countries by land or sea, bringing the estimated total since 2012 to 168,500. A year-by-year break- down of the outlow is presented below on page 8.*
Overview
Following violence in northern Rakhine state, Myanmar, in October and November 2016, as many as 43,000 Rohingya refugees were estimated to have crossed from northern Rakhine state into the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh on foot and by boat across the Naf River by 31 December 2016. An additional 31,000 newly arrived Rohingya refugees were identiied in Bangladesh in January and February 2017.
Thousands of Rohingya refugees were also believed to have travelled to India overland via Bangladesh in 2016, including 1,000 who have already registered with UNHCR, continuing what has been a steady low since 2012.
Mixed movements of refugees and migrants by sea across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea remained disrupted in 2016, with only rumors of isolated attempts and no confirmed maritime arrivals. Small numbers of Rohingya attempted the overland journey from Myanmar to Malaysia in 2016, but dozens were apprehended en route.
The absence of large-scale mixed movements from Myanmar to Malaysia in 2016 followed a peak in such movements from 2012 to 2015, when over 100,000 Rohingya refugees were estimated to have attempted the sea journey alongside Bangladeshi migrants. UNHCR estimates on deaths, demographics, and the circumstances of women and girls during that period is presented below on pages 7-8 and 11-12.
At least seven vessels carrying a total of at least 89 asylum-seekers and migrants sailed through South-East Asia in an attempt to reach Australia in 2016. At the end of 2016, there were 1,661 refugees and asylum-seekers who attempted to reach Australia by sea located in offshore processing centres in Papua New Guinea and Nauru or in detention centres in Australia.
*The total number of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons in the Asia-Paciic region is estimated at 420,000 and 120,000, respectively.
WHY A REGIONAL FOCUS MODEL?
A key challenge faced by humanitarian agencies is how to ensure that limited available resources are allocated where they are most needed and are efficiently delivered in a principled manner. Decisions to allocate resources must strike a balance between meeting the immediate needs of crisis affected communities and supporting efforts to strengthen resilience and response preparedness to future emergencies.
To support humanitarian partners address some of these challenges, the OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) produces the Regional Focus Model (RFM) similar to previous analyses in 2015 and 2016, the model is based on INFORM (http://www.inform-index.org/), a global risk index that identifies and analyze where crises requiring international assistance may occur. It can be used to support decisions about disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response.
The model identifies hazard-prone countries that combine high vulnerability to hazards and low capacity to respond and are therefore more likely to accept or request support from the international community. The model also includes a "Humanitarian" component reflecting issues more directly related to OCHA's coordination work. It is designed to be a practical tool to inform and guide disaster managers. The tool is also used by OCHA to guide its regional strategic framework and annual work plan.
In 2017, the RFM covers analysis of 38 countries in the Asia-Pacific region under ROAP in Bangkok, Thailand and Office of the Pacific in Suva, Fiji.
This report is the collaboration of Save the Children and the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network with funding support from the Oak Foundation.
This report examines current policy framework and practices in five countries, namely Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia and the Republic of Nauru. The research is the result of extensive desk-based research, stakeholder consultations in South East Asia and interviews with child asylum seekers and refugees. The research documents current practices in detention of child asylum seekers and refugees, the conditions of detention and the impact of detention on children. It also explores available alternatives to detention in these countries and emerging initiatives that may offer new, improved or expanded alternatives to detention in the future. It offers a number of principles and recommendations which aim to end the practice of detaining children for immigration purposes and to ensure that alternatives to detention are safe and appropriate for children.
The report aims to contribute to ending the practice of child immigration detention in line with the commitment of States in the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants (2016).
